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State Homestead Exemptions
The purpose of this article is to make a general comparason of home-
stead exemptions in Montana with other states.
There are at least two different types of homestead laws, federal
and state; the discussion herein relates to the latter. These laws must
be distinguished from the federal homestead legislation which seeks to
encourage the colonization of outlying districts by granting the qualified
applicant a quarter section or less of unappropriated public land after he
has occupied and cultivated .it for a certain period. This land is exempt
from all debts contracted prior to the acquisition of title but not from
those incurred thereafter. 1 State homestead laws, on the other hand,
affect land already owned by the beneficiary and only exempt it from
debts incurred subsequent to its dedication.
2
Homestead rights do not exist under the common law.3 They are,
it seems, peculiar to America, and are dependent upon constitutional or
statutory provisions. 4 The purpose of the homestead statutes is to carry
out the mandate of the constitution, "that the legislative assembly shall
enact liberal homestead and exemption laws." 5 As the homestead laws
were enacted for the benefit of the debtor, they should be liberally con-
strued in his favor. 6
The statutes of the different states vary on the conditions which
must be fulfilled before the homestead exemption may be claimed. As a
rule, the homestead exemption is limited to persons who are residents
of the particular state, who are heads of the family, and who own and
occupy the realty in question as a home. The family headship is as
important a condition as ownership and occupancy, and more generally
required than declaration, when the privilege of homestead exemption is
to be accepted under the statutory offer.7 The terms "householder" or
143 U.S.C.A. 161, 164, 175.
2WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION (1893) p. 924.
8First State Bank v. Fischer (1937) 67 N. Dok. 400, 272 N.W. 752,
110 A.L.R. 878.
4 1n re Trepp's Estate (1924) 11 Mont. 154, 227 P. 1005.
6MONT. CONST. Art XIX, &4, Mitchell v. McCormick (1899) 22 Mont.
249, 252, 56 P. 216.
6 regon Mtg Co., Ltd., v. Dunbar (1930) 87 Mont. 603, 606, 289 P.
559.
7WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION (1893) p. 57.
1
Mufich: State Homestead Exemptions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1948
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
"head of the family" when used in the statutes are not always defined,
but where this is done, they are not limited to those in a marital or par-
ental relationship and are made to include any person who as the result
of close kinship is under the moral obligation of supporting those living
with him under the same roof.8 Thus Montana has described by statute
those persons who come within the definition of "head of the family"
including among them every person who has attained the age of sixty
years and actually resides on the premises. 9 Under this provision it would
seem that a marital relationship is not necessary and a bachelor might
qualify by following the statutory requirements. It has been said that
primarily, the husband, and not the wife is the head of the family.10
However, in Montana under Section 6969, the wife may become the
head of the family where the husband fails to join in the declaration.1 1
Some states do not require expressly that the owner of the land need be
the "head of or a member of a family,"' 12 and so hold that this is not
a necessary condition to establishing the homestead. 13
Occupancy is another condition upon which the privilege of ex-
emption is tendered by the legislature. This condition is found in all
the statutes, generally speaking, and no other feature of the homestead
system approximates so closely in all. 14 In the absence of statutory pro-
visions prescribing the mode of selecting the homestead, occupation of
the land with a bona fide intent to use it as a home, is sufficient to im-
press it with that character. 15 But in Montana and some of the states
mere visible occupancy and use as a home are not sufficient, and a dec-
laration of homestead is required to be thade in writing and filed for
record. 16 . The declaration goes down on the title to the property the
same as a deed. Also, the Montana statutes require that the declaration
shall contain certain facts such as the estimated cash value and a de-
scription of the property. 17 Under this provision the Montana Supreme
Court has held that the declaration of homestead must contain the esti-
mated value and not the statutory value.18 Further, a declaration of
8Georgia Code Annot. (1926) 3377.
9R.C.M. 1935, 6969.
1Oin re Bordelon (1924) 2 F. (2d) 164.
11R.C.M. 1935
12 Oregon Code Annot. (1930) 3-201.
13 Koller v. Spody (1934) 148 Or. 65, 34 P. (2d) 663.
14WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION (1893) p. 57.
152 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (perm. ed. 1939) 987.
16R.C.M. 1935, 6970, Rev. Stot. of Fla. (1920) l3875, Rev. Lows of
Nev. (1912) 3115, Va. Code (1930) 6532, W. Va. Code Annot.
(1943) 3912.
17R.C.M. 1935, (6971.18Mitchell v. McCormick (1899) 22 Mont. 249, 252, 56 P. 216.
2
Montana Law Review, Vol. 9 [1948], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/11
NOTE AND COMMENT
homestead is valid and effective, though the estimated cash value is far
in excess of the limit fixed in the statute, provided it contains the other
statements required; but, as to area, the premises described must fall within
the statutory limit, otherwise the declaration is ineffective to exempt the
property claimed. 19 It has been said that the requirements of the statute
by which a homestead exemption right becomes fixed are mandatory and
must be complied with. 20
The property with respect to which the homestead claim may be
asserted is, by statutory provision, limited as to the quantity or value,
distinctions being made by some of the states with regard to the character
of the land as urban or rural. Some also allow only one comprehensive
exemption. The various state statutes present many diversities.
A homestead exemption can not be claimed against debts and liens
in existence prior to or at the time the exemption law takes effect.21
The statutes usually provide that the homestead may be subjected to
sale for the non-payment of certain debts or liens. Pro-existing liens and,
taxes belong almost invariably to this category, and purchase-money mort-
gages, mechanics, laborers and materialmen's liens, when these are de-
rived from improvements placed on the premises, are often given a priv-
ileged status.2 2 Effect must also be given to the laws creating these valid
liens and to the rights acquired thereunder. 23 In Montana under Section
6949, ". . .the homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satis-
faction of judgments obtained: 1. Before the declaration of homestead
was filed for record, and which constitute liens upon the premises; but
no judgments obtained before this code takes effect shall constitute such
liens . . .,,14 Thus is was held that a judgment obtained prior to the
time this statute went into effect was not a lien on the homestead sub-
ject to execution whatever its value; hence, a mortgage of the homestead
given after the statute took effect was given precedence to the prior
judgment 26 Under Section 6949 it is to be noted that it refers to judg-
ments which are liens on the premises. This section does not include
attachments as a means of getting at the homestead for the payment
19Yerrick v. Higgins (1899) 22 Mont. 502, 508, 510, 57 P. 95.
20Power v. Burd (1896) 18 Mont. 22, 43 P. 1094.
212 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (perm. ed. 1939) &991.
22Calif. Civ. Code (Deering 1931) 1241, Ga. Code (1933) 651-101,
Comment in 46 YALE L. J. 1023 (1936-7).
23Supra, note 3.
2 4 Supra, note 11.
26Vincent v. Vineyard (1900) 24 Mont. 207, 61 P. 131, 81 Am. St.
Rep. 423.
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of debts. Property seized under a writ of attachment is impressed with
a lien from the date on which the writ is levied, and this lien continues
in force until judgment.2 6 The effect of this has been the Montana
Supreme Court's holding that the filing of a homestead declaration after
a writ of attachment had been levied upon the land exempts the land
from sale on execution obtained after the declaration was filed. 27 Thus
this section was liberally construed in favor of the debtor for whose benefit
the homestead exemption was enacted. However, many jurisdictions in-
clude attachments with execution and forced sale2 8 and therefore hold
that the homestead right cannot be claimed against a prior attachment
lien previously levied.2
Whether one who has supplied materials may claim a lien under
a statute which subjects homestead property to liability for the hens of
mechanics or laborers is a question which has occasioned a conflict among
the decisions. 30 In some states it is declared by constitutional provision
that a homestead is not subject to a mechanic's lien.3 1 However, the
Montana statutesupra, expressly makes the homestead subject to me-
chanics' liens upon the premises, and it was held that a homestead is
subject to the lien of a mechanic for material, as well as labor, where the
material is the object of the labor for which he claims his lien.3 2 But, in
California it has been held under a similar statute, ". . . that no lien is
given to material-men; nor does any other statute in California confer
such a lien." 3 3 Regardless of this factor favoring a similar holding in
Montana, the Montana Supreme Court has said that the homestead laws
of Montana were not taken from California -and that our courts are not
bound by the California decisions on this point.3 4 This difference in
the decisions is probably due to the fact that Montana has special statutes
on mechanics' liens expressly naming those who may be entitled to such
a lien. These statutes include one who furnishes materials.3a
2 6 Moreland v. Monarch Mining Co. (1919) 55 Mont. 419, 425, 178 P.
175.27 Wall v. Duggon (1926) 76 Mont. 239, 244, 245 P. 953.
28Colo. Stot. Ann. (1935) Ch. 93, 23, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) &5042.
2 9Robinson v. Wilson (1875) 15 Kons. 448, 22 Am. Rep. 272, Kelly v.
Dill (1877) 23 Minn. 435.
3065 A.L.R. Annot. 1198.
3 1Morgan v. Bentheim (1898) 10 S. Dak. 650, 75 N.W. 204, 66 Am. St.
733, Volker-Scowcroft Lbr. Co. v. Vance (1907) 32 Utah 74, 88 P.
896, 125 Am. St. 828.
3 2Merrigan v. English (1889) 9 Mont. 113, 125, 22 P. 454.
3 3Richards v. Shear (1886) 70 Calif. 187, 11 P. 607.
3 4 Lindley v. Davis (1887) 7 Mont. 206, 212, 14 P. 717, 719.
3 5R.C.M. (1935) &&8338-8350.
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In the absence of constitutional or statutory restrictions, the ownet
of premises which have been occupied in circumstances entitling him to
assert the claim of homestead in respect thereof may mortgage the prop-
erty, and thercby subject it to sale under foreclosure proceedings. 36 The
laws of some states, however, forbid the mortgaging of homestead property,
declaring invalid a mortgage or trust deed thereof.3 7 It is a general rule
that both husband and wife must join in or, at least, consent to a con-
veyance of the homestead to a third person. 3 8 Where this rule prevails,
it is generally held that the husband cannot mortgage the homestead
without her joining in the manner prescribed by law.39 In Montana the
homestead is subject to
"... judgments obtained; 3. On debts secured by mortgages on
the premises, executed and acknowledged by the husband and wife,
.; 4. On debts secured by mortgages on the premises, executed
and recorded before the declaration of homestead was filed for
record." 40
In this connection it was held that a mortgage on property exempt from
forced sale, whether involving homestead or personalty, being specific,
constitutes at lease a waiver of exemption and is permissible if statutory
restrictions are observed.4 1 But, where the ackwonledgement of the wife
in the mortgage of the homestead was substantially defective, the mort-
gage was held void.42 Also, it was held that when a wife did not sign
otherwise join her husband in the execution of a chattel mortgage on im-
provements on their land, and, after her husband deserted her, filed a
homestead claim on such land, the mortgage was void.43 Section 6949
contemplates a live mortgage at the time of execution and not one the
lien of which has been barred by a special statute of limitations prior to
declaration of homestead and before final judgment.44 These decisions
show that it is absolutely necessary in Montana for the husband and
wife to join in any conveyance or encumbrance of their homestead before
36AM. JUR., Homesteads, &123.
3 7Sampson v. Williamson (1851) 6 Tex. 102, 55 Am. Dec. 762.
38THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (perm. ed. 1939) 1005.
39 Wotterson v. E. L. Banner Co. (1897) 19 Mont. 554, 48 P. 1103.
40Supra, note 25.4 1U. S. Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Stevens (1932) 93 Mont. 11, 16, 17 P.
(2d) 62.
4 2 Americon Soy. & Loon Assn. v. Burghordt (1897) 19 Mont. 323, 48
P. 391, 61 Am. St. Rep. 507.
4 3Supra, note 40.
4 4Siuru v. Sell (1939) 108 Mont. 438, 443, 91 P. (2d) 411, 123,
A.L.R. 423.
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it can become effective. A mortgage by the husband without the wife's
acknowledgment creates no lien upon the homestead.4 The reason for
this attitude by the courts is probably because when the homestead dedi-
cation or occupation is one of the conditions to the enjoyment of exemp-
tion, a restraint upon alienation and encumbrance is imposed for the pur-
pose of family protection and conservation.4 6
The authorities are in conflict upon the question as to whether
the lien of a judgment does or noes not attach to the homestead of the
debtor. The majority opinion seems to be that a judgment is not a lien
against premises impressed with the homestead character and subject
to the homestead use, and that an attachment or execution attempted
to be levied thereon is absolutely void.4 7 Other cases hold that the lien
attaches, but it is dormant or in abeyance so long as the homestead con-
tinues.4 8 The consequence of the former rule is that the purchaser of
the homestead property will take title free and clear of all judgment liens
or dbts, except those enumerated in the statutes as exceptions to the ex-
emption.49 Whereas under the latter rule, when the homestead is con-
veyed, the lien becomes active and the grantee takes the property subject
to such lien, and therefore the creditors of the grantor could realize upon
their liens on the property. 50 In the Oregon case of Hansen v. Jones,6 1
the creditor of the homestead claimant had obtained a judgment against
her and had filed the transcript of record in court. Thereafter the owner
conveyed the land to her son who was living apart from her. A levy
was then made upon the property and the property was reconveyed to
the claimant. The court adopted the latter view above and held that
"... the judgment became a lien on the land ...while it was
in fact the claimant's homestead, although the judgment was in-
capable of enforcement while the land was so held. But, when the
claimant conveyed the property the homestead right ceased to
exist, and her grantee took the full title freed therefrom, but sub-
ject nevertheless to the judgment lien, which from that time, be-
came superior in right." 62
The conclusion that the grantee of the homestead property takes it sub-
ject to judgment liens was based mainly upon the ground that the statute
providing. ... "from the date of docketing a judgment ...such judg-
46Mont. Not. Bank v. Schmidt (1887) 6 Mont. 609, 13 P. 382.
46Supra, note 7, p. 383.
47Supro, note 39, 992,481d.49 Gray v. Deal (1915) 50 Okla. 89, 151 P. 205.
60Honsen v. Jones (1915) 57 Oreg. 416, 109 P. 868.
61Id.
6 2 1f.
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ment shall be a lien ... ," was enacted prior to the homestead law and
that, since the homestead act did not expressly provide for an exemption
from a judgment lien, the homestead property was subject thereto.5 3
However, another exemption statute was passed in Oregon after the above
decision which exempts the homestead from the lien of every judgment;54
therefore, this decision probably does not represent the present law in
Oregon on this subject. Montana would probably follow along with the
majority rule on this point, although there might be a little difficulty.
It is provided by Section 6948 that "The homestead is exempt from
execution or forced sale, except as in this chapter provided." 5 5 Section
9410 states that "A judgment becomes a lien upon all the real property
of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution or forced sale . ."
These two statutes read eogether with the decision in Vincent v. Vine-
yard,57 supra, are indications that Montana would follow the majority
rule above. Furthermore, the appraisement statutes in Montana to the
effect that if the property exceeds the statutory value, then it can be
levied on, otherwise not,5 8 would strengthen this position. The reason
for the rule that a judgment is not a lien against the land claimed as a
homestead is based upon the theory that a judgment is not a lien upon
that which cannot be sold on execution. While both judgment liens and
homestead exemptions are creatures of statute, the exemption being the
later expression of the legislative intent and power, displaces the judg-
ment lien, as both cannot stand together in their full extent. 59
It is generally recognized as an essential requisite of an abandon-
ment of a homestead that there must be an actual relinquishment of pos-
session of the premises and removal therefrom, coupled with an intention
to remain away formed after such removal. A mere intention to abandon
the homestead, without carrying such intention into effect by actual re-
moval, is not abandonment. 60 The question of whether a homestead
claimant has abandoned his homestead being mainly one of intent, no
general rule of universal application can be enunciated, and the question
must depend upon the peculiar facts of each case.6 1 In Montana and some
63Marsholl, Homestead Exemption---Oregon Law, 20 OREG. L. REV. 328
(1940-41).
64 Oregon Code (1930) 3-201.
65R.C.M. 1935.6 61d.
5 7 Supra, note 26.
58R.C.M. 1935, 6953-6965.
59Supra, note 48.
6013 R. C. L. 108.
6 1Stewort v. Pritchard (1911) 101 Ark. 101, 141 S.W. 505, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 807.
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other states it is expressly provided by statute that a homestead can
be abandoned only by a declaration of abandonment or by a grant or
conveyance of the property will not constitute an abandonment of the
homestead right.6 2 Where the method of abandonment is expressly pre-
scribed, it is the general rule that a homestead once lawfully created can
be abandoned only in the manner pointed out.63 Montana requires a
declaration of abandonment of the homestead or a grant of it to be
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife,6 and it is effec-
tual only from the time it is filed in the office in which the homestead
was recorded.6 6 Thus, a creditor knows as of any time whether or not
the property of his debtor is a homestead or if there is any encumbrance
on the property. It has been held in Montana that in the absence of
legislation to that effect, alienation of a homestead granted to a sur-
viving wife does not constitute an abandonment of it.66
The claim of homestead may be defeated if a release or waiver
of the right to the exemption is shown.6 7 But ordinarily, it is inconsistent
with the statute to allow a waiver of the homestead right without a deed
or mortgage. 68 Although waiver or release of the homestead exemption
is not expressly provided for in Montana, it has been held that a mort-
gage operates as a waiver of the homestead exemption if it is properly
executed and acknowledged by husband and wife.6 9 In the case of Vin-
cent v. Vineyard, supra, the Montana Supreme Court stated that
"... the mortgage operated as a waiver of the homestead exemp-
tion in favor of the mortgagee and those claiming under him, which
waiver did not inure to the benefit of other persons."'70
Thus such a waiver of the exemption does not affect the homestead as
to everyone, but it is effective only as to the particular mortgagee and
those claiming through him. In some states a specific release of waiver
of the homestead is necessary to the validity of a conveyance of home-
stead property 7 ' and in others the homestead exemption may be waived
merely by failure to make a written claim of the exemption when execu-
tion is attempted.7 2
6 2Compell v. Largilliere Co. (1927) 44 Ida. 293, 256 P. 371, Brown v.
Mancs, (1926) 140 Wash. 525, 250 P. 36.
63Supra, note 61.
64R.C.M. 1935, 66951.
6 51d., 6952.
6 6Kerlee v. Smith (1912) 46 Mont. 19, 23, 124 P. 777.
67Supra, note 37, &192.
68Supra, note 26.
69Supra, note 42 and note 45.7OSupra, note 26, p. 217.7 1Gillispie v. Fulton Oil & Gas Co. (1908) 236 III. 188, 86 N.E. 219.
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As was stated before, the homestead exemption statutes being en-
acted for the benefit of the debtor, should be liberally construed in his
favor. It has been shown by statutes and court decisions that Montana
has maintained this theory for the protection of the debtor's home and
family. In some instances it has been a little more strict than other
states and in others more liberal. Keeping in mind other statutes and
rights arising thereunder such as the constitutional provision against im-
pairment of contrtacts by the states,7 3 it is only a matter of logical rea-
soning to see why the states cannot go beyond a certain limit in allowing
such exemptions.
William P. Mufich.
"20reg. Code Ann. (1930) 8204, Coleman v. Birmingham Fertilizer Co.(1922) 208 Ala. 160, 93 So. 904, Andrews v. McCreory Lbr. Co.
(1924) 155 La. 730, 99 So. 579, 33 A.L.R. 608.
73U. S. CONST. Art I, 10.
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